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Abstract
In a ceteris-paribus semantics for deontic logic, a state of affairs where a larger set of prescrip-
tions is respected is preferable to a state of affairs where some of them are violated. Conditional
preference nets (CP-nets) are a compact formalism to express and analyse ceteris paribus pref-
erences, which nice computational properties. This paper shows how deontic concepts can be
captured through conditional preference models. A restricted deontic logic will be defined, and
mapped into conditional preference nets. We shall also show how to model contrary to duties
obligations in CP-nets and how to capture in this formalism the distinction between strong and
weak permission.
Keywords: Deontic logic, conditional preference models, ceteris-paribus semantics, contrary
to duty, strong and weak permission.
2 Modeling Contrary-to-Duty with CP-nets
1 Introduction
Modelling deontic notions through preferences [12] has the advantage of linking de-
ontic notions to the manifold research on preferences, in multiple disciplines, such as
philosophy, mathematics, economics and politics. In recent years, preferences have
also been addressed within AI [15,8,18] and applications can be found in multi-agent
systems [19] and recommender systems [17].
We shall model deontic notions through ceteris-paribus preferences, namely, con-
ditional preferences for a state of affairs over another state of affairs, all the rest being
equal. In particular, we shall focus on the ceteris-paribus preference for a proposition
over its complement. The idea of ceteris-paribus preferenceswas originally introduced
by the philosopher and logician Georg von Wright [22]. It provides the intuition at the
basis CP-nets [2], a compact formalism which allows for representing preferences and
reasoning about them.
Though some contributions have linked deontic concepts to ceteris paribus prefer-
ences (see [20]), none has so far focused on CP-nets. While the intersection between
deontic logic and CP-nets is yet unexplored, we think a cooperation among researches
from the two fields can be beneficial, and possibly lead to a new workable approach
to modelling norms and reason about them.
We shall indeed assume that norms establishing an obligation can be viewed as
expressing a social preference for situations in which the obligation is complied with
over situations in which it is violated. Similarly, we shall assume that norms es-
tablishing liberties (bilateral permissions) express indifference over complementary
situations.
We shall discuss two controversial topics in deontic logic, namely contrary to duty
obligations and the distinction between strong and weak permissions.
We shall show that a consistent CP-net can be built that captures both an obliga-
tion and the prescriptions specifying what should to be done in case the obligation
is violated, which may be incompatible with prescriptions on what should be done
in case of compliance [4]. We shall illustrate contrary to duties obligations with an
amusing example discussed in the literature. However, realistic examples of contrary
to duty obligations can be found in various domains, such as in commercial contracts,
where repair obligations can be established for delay or non-fulfilment: to inform,
compensate the damage, replace defective goods, pay penalties, etc. (for a logical
model see [11]. It can also be found in civil liability, where harmful behaviour is met
with obligations to repair, mitigate, and pay punitive damages in case of persistence.
We shall also show that a CP-net model can capture concepts of strong and weak
permission, a distinction that has been long discussed in deontic logic [23] and even
earlier in legal theory, in connection issues concerning the completeness of legal sys-
tems [24]. We shall indeed distinguish the case in which an action is positively permit-
ted, through a permissive norm, and the case in which the action is rather unregulated,
as no norm, and in particular, no prohibition addresses it.
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2 A running example
In this section, we introduce a running example, concerning the presence of cats, dogs,
and fences in beach houses (developing the example from [16]). The example is used
throughout the paper to explicate new notions when they are introduced.
Example 2.1 [Running example] Mary is the mayor of the Cattown, the city of cat
lovers. She knows that her community, with few exceptions, dislikes dogs and likes
cat. Cattown people also dislike the sight of fences around houses, and generally
prefer to be able to move around and visit each other without the obstacle of fences.
However, there was a problem with dogs entering other people’s property and causing
fear and sometimes harm. Moreover, people are fuzzy about the way in which their
town looks, they like that all houses and street furniture are white, as indeed they
are. Mary believes that her role consists in defining policies that fit the preferences
of her constituency. Thus, she has enacted the following, making them mandatory in
Cattown:
• dogs are forbidden
• people may have a cat or not
• if there is dog, then there should be a fence
• if there is a fence, it should be white.
• if there is no dog, then there should be no fence.
Thoughmost people in her constituency like these policies, some do not. In particular,
there a few dog lovers in the city, who did not share the approach to dogs prevailing in
Cattown. However, Mary believes that –given the preferences of the majority and the
history and peculiar spirit of Cattown– her regulation articulates a social perspective,
namely, a view of the community on what it prefers and a view that can justifiably be
imposed on all its citizens. If a dog lover has decided to move into Cattown, he should
have known what he would find there.
An issue has recently emerged concerning bobcats. It is being debated whether in
the absence of a provision prohibiting or allowing bobcats, John is allowed to keep
this bobcat in his garden. Mary thinks that he is not, he should have asked for it, while
John believes that he is. Can they conflict of opinion be explained away as merely
concerning a conceptual misunderstanding (on the notion of a permission)?
3 Deontic language and Contrary to duty
To formally express rules such as those enacted by Mary, a restricted deontic language
is sufficient. Here we provide a specification of this language. Let Atm be a count-
able set of atomic propositions and let LitAtm = Atm ∪ {¬p : p ∈ Atm}, be the
corresponding set of literals. Under this assumption, we can identify propositional
valuations (or worlds) with maximal consistent conjunctions of literals.
Definition 3.1 [A restricted norm language]. The languageLRDL(Atm) over a set of
atoms Atm is defined as follows:
• a norm of Atm is any expression having the formO(ψ|φ) or P(ψ|φ) where φ is a
literal in LitAtm and ψ is a conjunction of such literals
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• LRDL(Atm) is the set of all norms of Atm and conjunctions of them.
Formulas O(ψ|φ) and P(ψ|φ) have to be read, respectively, “under condition ψ,
φ is obligatory” and “under condition ψ, φ is permitted.” Note the limitation in our
language that does not allow for deontic operatorsO and P to be applied to disjunc-
tions.
Unconditional obligation and permission do not need to be added as primitives
in the language of the logic as they are definable from conditional obligation and
permission. We also do not need a primitive for the bilateral permission, or liberty,
which consists in the permission both of a proposition and of its complement.
Definition 3.2 For all ϕ ∈ LRDL(Atm):
O(φ) =def O(⊤|φ)
P(φ) =def P(⊤|φ)
L(ψ|φ) =def P(ψ|φ) ∧P(ψ|¬φ)
L(φ) =def L(⊤|φ)
Using this language and taking into account the previous proposition, we can
model obligations and permissions depicted in Example 2.1. Thus we use the fol-
lowing abbreviations d for ”there is a dog”, c for ”there is a cat”, f for ”there is a
fence”, w for ”the fence is white”, b for ”there is a bobcat”. We can express the norms
enacted by Mary as follows:
O(¬d)
L(c)
O(¬d|¬f)
O(d|f)
O(f |w)
3.1 Contrary to duty obligations
The norms in our running example include two “contrary to duty” obligations, namely,
obligations that are triggered by the violation of another obligation. According to
the norm O(d|f), having a dog, and thus violating norm O(¬d) (the prohibition to
have dogs), triggers the obligation to have a fence. Similarly, according to the norm
O(f |w), having a fence, and thus violating norm O(¬f ) (the prohibition to have a
fence), triggers the obligation to have it white.
Contrary to duty obligations cannot be captured by standard deontic logic, accord-
ing to whose semantics a proposition is obligatory if and only if it is true in every
perfect (ideal) world, a world in which everything is as it should be. But the world
in which a contrary to duty obligation is triggered is subideal one, since in it another
obligation is violated, and it remains subideal even if the contrary to duty obligation is
complied with. In all perfect worlds in Cattown there are no dogs, and in such worlds
there are also no fences in Cattown. So, according to the semantic for standard deontic
logic there cannot be an obligation to have fences. Various attempts have been made
to capture the idea of contrary to duty (see for instance [21,3,10]).
The problem is that a semantics that just distinguishes between ideal and non-ideal
worlds cannot capture contrary to duty obligations: compliance with a contrary to duty
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obligation takes us to a world that is better – ceteris paribus – then a world in which
the contrary to duty is not complied with, but which is still imperfect. A world with
dogs and fences is ceteris paribus better than a world which does not have fences, but
the former is still worse than a world in which, ceteris paribus, there are no dogs.
To capture contrary to duty obligations we need a semantics that distinguishes
different levels of preferability, so that we can distinguish the imperfect situation in
which the main duty is violated, but the contrary to duty obligation is complied, from
the even more imperfect situation in which both the main duty and the contrary to duty
obligation are violated.
3.2 Strong and weak permissions
Our running example also shows the difference between strong (explicit) and weak
(tacit) permissions, an issue much debated within deontic logic. On the one hand, cats
are regulated: there is a norm that deals with cats (L(c)), by stating that both having
and not having cats is allowed. On the other hand, nothing is said about bobcats. In
other terms, while the normative system expresses an equal preference for having and
not having cats (both are OK), it express no attitude towards bobcats.
This distinction too cannot be captured by the semantics for standard deontic logic,
whereP(φ) means that there is at least one perfect world in which φ is true, in which
case ¬O(¬φ) is true.
In legal logic, the most popular perspective to distinguish strong and weak permis-
sions is an inferential one. To say that φ is strongly permitted relative to a normative
system means that the normative entails P(φ). To say that φ is weakly permitted
means that the normative system under consideration does not entail a corresponding
prohibitionO(¬φ) .
Here we shall provide for a different way to capture the difference between strong
and weak permission, based on the distinction between indifference (equal ceteris-
paribus preference) and incomparability (absence of any preference).
4 CP-nets
In order to be able to represent the described scenario, we propose to leverage on
existing preference frameworks from AI, namely CP-nets. A CP-net [2] is a compact
representation of conditional preferences in the ceteris paribus semantics. Conditional
preferences describe how the preference of an individual for a specific feature can
depend on the choice over some other features. A common example is ”I prefer to
drink red wine if meat is served. Otherwise, if fish is served, I prefer to drink white
wine, all the rest being equal. CP-nets and related extensions of the formalism [5,6]
are often on multi-valued variables, this means that variables are not strictly boolean.
Nevertheless, in this work we assume that all the variables have binary domains. We
start by introducing and defining some useful notions.
4.1 Ceteris-Paribus Preferences
We assume a set of variables (also called features or attributes) V = {X1, . . . , Xn}
each one with binary domain, i.e. the domain of eachXi ∈ V is such thatDom(Xi) =
{xi, xi}. An instantiation Ass(X), where X ⊆ V , is an assignment of values to X .
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When X = V then we call it a complete assignment or outcome or world, otherwise
we call it a partial assignment. The notation o[Vi] returns the value of the variable
Vi in the outcome o, while o[−Vi] returns the value of all the variables but Vi in the
outcome o.
A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation  over the set of all out-
comes O = 2V , which are usually denoted by o, w, . . . , v. In what follows, w  v
means that v is at least as good/ideal as w, w ≈ v means that w is equivalent to v
which is an abbreviation for w  v and v  w. Moreover,w ≺ v means that v is bet-
ter/more ideal than v to be an abbreviation of w  v and v  w. Given two possible
outcomes w, v ∈ O, if neither w  v nor v  w are valid, then we say that w and v
are incomparable, denoted with w ⊲⊳ v.
We borrow some notations from [2] in order to define ceteris paribus semantics.
Definition 4.1 [Ceteris-Paribus Preference] Given a set of variables V and nonempty
sets X,Y, Z that partition V . Let z ∈ Ass(Z) and x1, x2 ∈ Ass(X), we say that x2
is ceteris-paribus at least as good as or better than x1 given z if and only if for all
y1, y2 ∈ Ass(Y )
x1y1z  x2y2z and x1y2z  x2y1z
we use z : x1 Y x2 (≺Y resp.) as an abbreviation for it (we will omit the subscript
when it is clear from the context).
As the preference for x1 over x2, in the context of z, is independent from the
values of Y, we may say thatX is preferentially independent of Y if Z = ∅ otherwise
thatX is said to be conditionally preferentially independent of Y given the assignment
of Z .
Moreover, from Definition 4.1 we derive the following notation regarding ceteris-
paribus relation between two outcomes u, v.
Definition 4.2 Given two outcomes u, v ∈ U , we say that u is ceteris-paribus at least
as good as or better than v relative toXi, if and only if they differ only in the value of
the variableXi and we abbreviate it with v u[Xi] u.
Let us refer to Example 2.1. Mary’s community preferences are over a set of
five features, V = {C,D, F,W,B}, with the following domains: Dom(C) = {c, c¯},
Dom(D) = {d, d¯},Dom(F ) = {f, f¯},Dom(W ) = {w, w¯} andDom(B) = {b, b¯}.
The meaning of variables are the same introduced in Section 3 for atoms: for instance,
variable C concerns cats, it value is c of c¯ depending on whether there is a cat or not.
Since V has 5 elements, the set of all outcomes U = 2V contains 32 possible
outcomes. For the sake of readability, we do not consider in this section variable
W and C in order to consider a reduced number of outcomes and make the partial
orders limited in size. Thus, considering the subset {B,D, F}, the set of outcomes
are denoted by the complete assignments to considered variables:
U = {bdf, b¯df, bd¯f, bdf¯ , b¯df¯ , bd¯f¯ , b¯d¯f, b¯d¯f¯}
The different attitudes of the community can be represented with a set of ceteris
paribus preferences. In particular, the negative attitude to dogs is represented by pref-
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erence for ¬dogs-assignments over ceteris-paribus dog-assignments (i.e. d ≺V \D d¯):
bdf ≺ bd¯f, b¯df ≺ b¯d¯f, bdf¯ , bd¯f¯ , b¯df¯ ≺ b¯d¯f¯
Preference is ceteris-paribus (about d) in the sense that it only concerns the comparison
between dog-assignments and ¬dog-assignments that are equal in all the rest (bobcats
and fences). These are all pair of outcomes u and v such that the evaluations of u and
v coincide in all values except forD.
Preference for having fences when there are dogs in the house is captured by pref-
erences for fence-assignments over the ceteris-paribus ¬-fence-assignments, taking
only dog-assignments into consideration (i.e. d : f¯ ≺B f ):
bdf¯ ≺ bdf, b¯df¯ ≺ b¯df
Instead, unawareness to bobcats can be modelled through incomparability between
bobcat-assignments and ¬-bobcat-assignments, which expresses unfamiliarity to the
presence of bobcats, i.e. for all x1, x2 ∈ Ass(D) and y1, y2 ∈ Ass(F ) : bx1y1 ⊲⊳
b¯x2y2.
At last, let us consider to have cats and not to have them, this can be represented
through the indifference for cat-assignments over ceteris paribus ¬-cat-assignments
(i.e. c ≈V \C c¯). These are all pair of outcomes u and v where u[−C] = v[−C] such
that v is weakly preferable to u and vice-versa (u  v ∧ v  u), that is for instance:
cbd¯f ≈ c¯bd¯f, cbdf¯ ≈ c¯bdf¯
4.2 Incomparability
In the previous section, we introduced the notion of incompatibility. In the ceteris
paribus semantics, the notion of incomparability does not allow to differentiate be-
tween two different states of affairs: one where two outcomes are incomparable be-
cause nothing is said about some values of a feature, and another, where two or more
variables are independent and thus preferences are described over the domains of these
variables no matter the assignment of the others. Both cases induce a preference graph
where some outcomes are incomparable because there does not exist a path between
them, i.e. given two incomparable outcomes w, v then w T v, v T w,w ⊀T v
and v ⊀T w. But, while the former case describes a lack of information, possibly
because the individual does not know or does not have any information about some
features (for instance in our example the lack of information about bobcats), the latter
describes a situation where preferences are reported on all the features but not on the
combination of them. The lack of dependencies seems to be simpler to fix: the indi-
vidual already has all the information on the features, thus the incomparability can be
avoid by adding a dependency between some of the variables.
Definition 4.3 [Strong incomparability] Given a preorder P , two outcomes w, v ∈ P
are said to be strongly incomparable if they belong to two different components of P .
Strong incomparability describes the relation among outcomes of different compo-
nents; they are incomparable because some information is missing, specifically pref-
erences are not reported for some features. This lack of information can be hard to fix,
since it entails a lack of knowledge.
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The following definition refers to weakly connected components: a directed graph
is said to be weakly connected if the undirected graph resulting from removing the
orientation of the edges is connected, i.e. if any pair of vertexesw, v in the undirected
graph has a path from w to v.
Definition 4.4 [Weak incomparability] Given a preorder P , two outcomes w, v ∈
P are said to be weakly incomparable if they belong to the same weakly connected
component of P but there does not exist a path from w to v or vice-versa.
Weak incomparability describes a less problematic situation. In this case, prefer-
ences are reported but the incomparability is due to somemissing dependencies among
features. Thus, correcting this kind of incomparability can be quite simple.
4.3 Conditional Preference Networks
Given the above definitions, we can now define conditional preference networks (CP-
net).
Definition 4.5 A CP-net over a set of binary variables V = {V1, . . . , Vn} is a tuple
N = (G,CPT ), whereG = (V,E) is a directed graph andCPT = {CPT (Vi)|Vi ∈
V } is a set of conditional preference tables (or CP-tables). An edge (Vi, Vj) ∈ E
represents that preferences overDom(Vj) depend on the value of Vi.
For each variable Vi ∈ V, aCPT (Vi) is a set of cp-statements, each one represents
an ordering over the specific domainDom(Vi) given the assignment to the parents of
Vi, e.g. CPT (D) = {d¯ ≺ d}. In its original formulation, each CPT (Vi) reports
strict linear order over the values of the domain of Vi given the partial assignment
to Pa(Vi). A more recent extension, namely CP-net with indifference [1], takes into
account indifference and it also models lack of information through incomparability.
In this work we adopt this extension of CP-net. The semantics is connected with
the induced preference graph over all the outcomes, that is a complete assignment of
values to variables. A directed edge between pair of outcomes (oi, oj), which differ
only in the value of one variable, means that oj  oi. A worsening flip is a change in
the value of a variable to a less preferred value according to the cp-statement for that
variable.
The semantics of the CP-net with indifference is a preorder over all the outcomes,
i.e. a reflexive and transitive binary relation over the set of complete assignment of
values to the variables of the CP-net. Thus, for any two outcomes o, u which differs
only on the value of one variableXi ∈ V we have:
• o  u if o[Xi]  u[Xi] given o[Pa(Xi)]
• o ⊲⊳ u if there is not a cp-statements for o[Xi], u[Xi] given o[Pa(Xi)]
The partial order induced by the CP-net is denoted as OrdN .
The CP-net formalism provides a qualitative compact representation that is useful
to represent scenarios similar to the one depicted by the reduced deontic logic intro-
duced in Section 3.
Based on preferences described in Example 2.1, Figure 1 reports the dependency
graph and the CP-tables of the CP-net. The CP-net is over the set of variables V =
{B,C,D, F,W}. Variable B does not have a CP-table because the community did
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B
C
D
F W
d¯ > d
c ≈ c¯
d¯ : f¯ > f
d : f > f¯
f : w > w¯
f¯ : w ≈ w¯
Fig. 1. The CP-net with indifference which represents Mary’s community preferences of Ex-
ample 2.1.
cdfwb
cdfwb
Most Preferred
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
Most Preferred
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
cdfwb
Fig. 2. The partial order induced by the CP-net: for the sake of readability, we group into the
same nodes some outcomes of the preference model. Outcomes in the same node are indifferent,
this is due to the indifference over the values of variable C.
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not express any preferences about bobcats. Notice the indifference on the values of
variable C which describes the liberty to have or not to have cats. The strong attitude
about dogs induces the strict order over the domain of the variableD. Orders over the
variable F depends on whether or not there is a dog and orders over the variable W
depends on whether or not there is a fence.
The partial order by the CP-net is reported in Figure 2. The binary relation among
outcomes is based on dependencies and preferences reported in the CP-tables of the
CP-net. For instance, outcomes cdfwb and cdfwb are in the same node due to the
indifference on the values of the variable C all the rest being equal, while cdfwb ≺
cdfwb because ¬dog-assignments are ceteris-paribus better than dog-assignments.
Notice that the preference graph has two components. Outcomes in the two com-
ponents differs on the assignment of the variable B for which no preferences are ex-
pressed, thus each component represent different scenario which differs from the other
for the presence of bobcats. As we described in the previous section, this is represented
with strong incomparability between outcomes of different components.
5 Deontic Language and CP-nets: bridging the gap
A set of obligations and liberties expressed in the restricted language define in Section
3 can be represented using a CP-net, we will call it a prescriptive CP-net. Note that we
do not provide for the representation of unilateral permission. In fact we assume that
unilateral permissionsmust be implied either by an obligation (in case the complement
is forbidden) or by a liberty (in case the complement is also permitted).
Indeed, the restriction on obligations and liberties where antecedents are conjunc-
tions of literals and consequent is a single literal is compatible with the syntax of
CP-net with indifference [1].
5.1 Modeling Deontic Language with CP-nets
In this section we define the CP-net that is induced by a given set of prescriptions.
Definition 5.1 Given a set of statements in C ⊆ LRDL(Atm) and the prescriptive
CP-netNC . InNC = (G,P ), G is a directed graph over a set of variables V such that:
• for each vi ∈ Atm corresponds a Vi ∈ V with Dom(Vi) = {vi, v¯i}
• each conditional obligation O(ψ|φ) ∈ C and each liberty L(ψ|φ) ∈ C, introduce
dependencies in G. Specifically, for each literal xj ∈ ψ, they introduce a directed
edge betweenXj and Φ in G, thusXj becomes a parent of Φ
• each obligationO(ψ|φ) ∈ C induces a strict order overDom(Φ) given the assign-
ment ψ such that CPT (Φ) = {ψ : φ¯ ≺ φ}
• each conditional liberty L(ψ|φ) ∈ C induces a weak order overDom(Φ) given the
assignment ψ such that CPT (Φ) = {ψ : φ¯ ≈ φ}.
Notice that variables with empty CP-tables or partially empty CP-tables may exist.
These variables will induce incomparability in the preorder.
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5.2 Mapping Preference Models with CP-nets
In this section we shall provide a ceteris paribus semantics for the deontic language
provided above. In the next session, we shall show that this semantics identifies mod-
els that correspond to CP-nets. The semantics of the deontic language is defined in
terms of preference relations on worlds.
Definition 5.2 [Preference models of LRDL] A preference model of LRDL,M = (
, U) is a preorder on the set U of outcomes.
A set of ceteris-paribus conditional obligations and liberties C is consistent if it
has at least one model, and inconsistent otherwise. A set of ceteris-paribus conditional
obligations and liberties C entails another preference formula C′, written C |= C′, if
every model of C is also a model of C′. In the following definition, an outcome
refers to conjunctions of propositional literals referring to each variable in V exactly
once, and which are consistent. Thus, for instance φ refers to valuation of variable
Φ. Satisfaction for formulas in the languageLRDL(Atm) is defined as follows, where
u |= ϕ means that the propositional formula ϕ is true at the valuation corresponding
to the outcome u:
Definition 5.3 [Satisfaction in LRDL] Given a set of norms C ⊆ LRDL and a prefer-
ence modelM = (U,), we say thatM satisfies C, if for eachO(ψ|φ),P(ψ|φ) ∈ C
the following hold:
M |= O(ψ|φ)⇐⇒∀v, u ∈ U : v, u |= ψ, if v |= φ and
v φ u then u |= φ
M |= P(ψ|φ)⇐⇒∀v, u ∈ U : v, u |= ψ, if v |= φ and
v ≺φ u then u |= φ
The class of models satisfying a set of norms C is denoted with PC . Among all
the possible M ∈ PC , rel(PC) ⊆ PC is the subset of models that refers only to
consistent conjunctions of propositional literals in C. Then MC = (U,C) is the
preference model such that for eachM = (U,) ∈ rel(PC),C⊆.
Proposition 5.4 As a liberty is a bilateral permission (L(ψ|φ) =def P(ψ|φ) ∧
P(ψ|¬φ)), we have that
M |= L(ψ|φ)⇐⇒∀v, u ∈ U : v |= ψ, u |= ψ,
if v |= φ and v ≺φ u then u |= φ, and
if v |= ¬φ and v ≺¬φ u then u |= ¬φ
Given the previous definitions we now show that a set of ceteris-paribus norms in
LRDL(Atm) is expressible with a prescriptive CP-net, this means that the preorder
induced by the CP-net is a model which satisfies C.
Theorem 5.5 Given a set of norms C ⊆ LRDL(Atm) and the prescriptive CP-net
NC , then OrdNC =MC .
12 Modeling Contrary-to-Duty with CP-nets
Proof. This is equivalent to prove that for each normN ∈ C
MC |= N iff OrdNC |= N (1)
We show how to prove (1) showing how this can be done for obligations. Let start by
assuming thatMC |= O(ψ|φ), by definition this is equivalent to ∀u, v ∈ U : u ≺ψ,φ
v, thus for for consistency ofNC with C:
OrdNC |= ψ : ¬φ ≺ φ
OrdNC |= ∀y1, y2 ∈ (V − Ψ− {Φ}) : ¬φψy1 ≺ φψy2
by definition, this is equivalent to
OrdNC |= ∀u, v ∈ U : u, v |= ψ, u |= ¬φ, v |= φ
OrdNC |=O(ψ|φ)
This proves =⇒ direction. We show the other way round (⇐=) by contradiction.
Let us assume that OrdNC 2 O(ψ|φ), thus O(ψ|φ) /∈ NC but this means that also
O(ψ|φ) /∈ C. But this is a contradiction. ✷
On the basis of the CP-net modellin described above the following propsitions
hold.
Proposition 5.6 A contrary to duty framework O(φ),O(¬φ|ψ),O(φ|¬ψ) is mod-
elled by a consistent CP-net.
Proof. The CP-net is reported in Figure 4.
Φ
Ψ
φ > φ¯
φ : ψ¯ > ψ
φ¯ : ψ > ψ¯
Fig. 3. The prescriptive CP-net induced by the duty framework of Proposition 5.6.
✷
6 Conclusions
Our analysis shows that a set of norms expressed in deontic logic can be translated
into a corresponding CP-net without loss of semantics, thus providing a conditional
preference network giving a compact representation.
On the contrary, CP-nets allow to model differ scenarios and to infer interesting
properties and information about the set of norms. The main problems that CP-nets al-
low to tackle are reasoning about the dominance testing and consistency testing. Both
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φψ¯
Most Preferred
φψ φ¯ψ¯
φ¯ψ
Fig. 4. The partial order induced by the prescriptive CP-net which satisfies the duty framework
of Proposition 5.6.
of them are in general far from easy. In the first problem we want to decide whether
one outcome v dominates u, i.e. u ≺ v. In the second problem we want to find out
whether there is a dominance cycle in the preorder defined by a CP-net, i.e. whether
there is an outcome that dominates (is preferred to) itself. In general both dominance
and consistency for CP-nets can be NP-complete [2,9]. But when the CP-net is over
a set of binary variables, and its dependency graph is a tree, the dominance testing
becomes linear in the number of variables, if it is a poly-tree than dominance testing
becomes polynomial in the number of variables [2]. Moreover, in many scenarios, the
presence of cycles in the dependency graph means that the network is inconsistent [7].
Thus, the consistency testing would allow to determine when a set of norms is incon-
sistent because contradictory while the dominance test allows to test whether a world
is better than another. Moreover, in recent studies, preferences represented with com-
pact representation are used in metric spaces in order to define how similar they are
[13,14]. Furthermore, as preference orders are exponential in the number of consid-
ered variables, it is of main importance being able to find feasible ways to compute the
distance among preferences exploiting the compact representation of such domains.
The results presented here represent just a preliminary exploration of intersection
between CP-nets and deontic logic, but it can provide a starting point for further re-
search.
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